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Wilber G. Katz
It is fitting that The University of Chicago Law Review dedicate this issue to the memory of Wilber Griffith Katz, who died on
May 17, 1979. In an unofficial but most meaningful way, he was,
along with Ernst Puttkammer, the mentor of the Review. He prodded it into being, and into the challenge it became for those who
worked on it. In many ways, some undoubtedly unknown to it, the
Law Review continues to manifest his influence. But in this respect
the Review is not alone. His efforts are reflected in the changing
nature of legal education, in the widened and deepened conception
by the Bar of its duties, and in the improvement of legal institutions. Those of us who were among his immediate students and
colleagues at the University of Chicago, and, I am sure, at the University of Wisconsin, cherish the relationship each of us had with
Wilber-a relationship each of us held as his own. But many, in
fact, shared such a relationship with him.
Wilber Katz joined the faculty of the University of Chicago Law
School in 1930. He had received his A.B. degree in 1923 from the
University of Wisconsin, his LL.D. from Harvard in 1926. He then
practiced in New York for two years with the firm of Root, Clark,
Buckner & Ballantine. For years after he left, members of the New
York Bar who knew of him would ask incredulously: "Why did he
leave?" Returning to Harvard.for a year of graduate study, he
earned his doctor's degree in law in 1930. At Harvard he worked with
Professor Felix Frankfurter; together they edited a casebook on federal jurisdiction and procedure.' I do not doubt that it was Professor

' F. FRANKFuRTER & W. KATz, CAsEs AD OTHER AumTm~ris ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION
AND PROCEDURE (1931).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:767

Frankfurter, among, others, who brought Wilber Katz to the attention of the new president of the University of Chicago, Robert
Hutchins.
Wilber Katz and Charles 0. Gregory were the first appointments made to the law faculty under the aegis of the new president.
The appointments had special significance. Hutchins, impressed
with the intellectual history of the University, was engaged in an
ebullient revitalization program reminiscent of the early days of
William Rainey Harper. Hutchins had many suggestions and ideas
for all parts of the University, received with varying degrees of enthusiasm and attention. So far as the Law School was concerned,
Hutchins was fresh from his experiences as the dean of Yale Law
School. There he had participated in an effort to broaden legal
studies to include social science disciplines and factual investigations, and to bring such studies and the resulting curriculum closer
to the requirements of modern society. Hutchins planned to have
William 0. Douglas, then an assistant professor at Yale, join the law
faculty at the University of Chicago, and with Katz and Gregory,.
further develop this kind of approach-an interdisciplinary emphasis on the problems to be solved and the social and economic effects
of the law's rules, through case law or legislation. Douglas accepted
appointment to the law faculty. The 1932 program of the Law
School shows the planned collaboration between Douglas and Katz.
Katz was to teach Business I, entitled "Losses"; 2 Douglas and Katz
were to teach together Business II, entitled "Management," 3 and
Business III, entitled "Finance"; Douglas was to teach Business IV,
entitled "Reorganization. ' 4 Gregory was to have the responsibility
in the related area of torts-the general rules for the allocation of
risk and the reservation of protected areas in the society. He was
also to develop a new course in the emerging field of labor law. Even
though Douglas changed his mind and stayed at Yale, the planned
collaboration made its mark: the program, in essence, went ahead.
The program challenged the instructors to look more deeply into
basic issues than a study of legal techniques would provide.
The area in which Katz assumed responsibility in his early
teaching was a vital one. The effects of the Depression had made
this clear. Reorganization, for example, was a field of intense social
and private interest, with new legislation, old theories evolved out
2 Previously, it would have been two separate courses: one in partnership and another
in agency.
Previously, this would have been limited to corporation law.
Business III and IV were expansions of the sequence into new areas of concern.
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of different conditions, and day-to-day circumstances that required new techniques. He later described with characteristic
dubiety the classroom effects:
I attempted to reproduce for my class the problems with which
I was struggling downtown [practicing law part-time with the
Chicago firm of Bell, Boyd and Marshall]. Section 77B was
still in its infancy and we were still puzzling about the application to reorganizations of the Securities Act of 1933. The state
courts were in doubt as to the duties of indenture trustees and
as to their own power to pass upon reorganization plans. I
proceeded to swamp my students with unreported decisions
and opinions of counsel, with deposit agreements, plans of reorganization and letters of solicitation, with practical techniques for dealing with the recalcitrant minority and the strikesuit lawyer. I think they enjoyed the course. It gave them the
exhilarating illusion of dealing with real and current problems.
They felt they were learning something which they could really
use as soon as they got out of school. But I have little doubt
today that I was cheating them. When they came to the Bar
the following year, the critical problems of reorganization practice were quite different. They had, of course, learned something. In my zeal for presenting the latest "dope," I had, to be
sure, given them some insight into the persistent problems in
the field-the problem of protective committees and conflicts
of interest, of the place of indenture trustees, and of criteria for
determining the fairness of reorganization plans. But how
much more valuable would my course have been if I had omitted many of the questions of temporary practical importance
and developed the place of the subject in the economics of
corporate enterprise.5
Katz was unfair to himself in his evaluation. But he was fair in
stating his abiding concerns as a teacher. He sought the long-run
implications, and the knowledge that other disciplines might usefully bring to bear-understood in theoretical form and in application. He wanted to simplify to get at the root of a problem. This was
the main reason, I think, that he was so interested in making available to his students the tool of accounting. Each course, indeed each
class hour, was architectonic-no mean achievement in planning or
execution when the educational method was Socratic discussin" Of
course, this didn't always work; it couldn't with the spontaneity of
I Katz, What Changes Are Practicalin Legal Education?,27 A.B.A.J. 759, 762 (1941).
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give and take. But when it did not, he made up for it. He was
conscientious about the subject matter and the success of the communication. His classes were fun; he shared his enthusiasm, and to
a large extent he shared his doubts. Moreover, to Wilber, teaching
was not just a classroom affair. He created a one-to-one relationship with his students. He challenged them individually to confront central questions of law and justice. It is not an overstatement
to say he changed their lives.
The faculty he had joined, and to which new members were
being added, took seriously the challenge to broaden legal studies.
There were many similar discussions going on throughout the University. The group was able, diverse, and, in retrospect, more appreciative and tolerant of each other than might have been expected.
What took place were not just curriculum discussions; rather, various ventures were tried. Wilber Katz recalled in his Memories of
an Ex-Dean:1 "Some of us enlisted for study of economics under the
gentle tutelage of Henry Simons, and also for reading of Aristotle
and Plato and St. Thomas under a less gentle tutor, Mortimer
Adler. ' ' 7 There was a great deal of sustained consultation with colleagues in other areas, and joint work across and, within departmental and professional school lines, in seminars, institutes, and
courses. Out of all this churning, a special faculty committee for a
new curriculum was eventually appointed. Katz was chairman of
the committee. The committee came forward with a "New Plan,"
which was adopted and put into effect progressively between 1937
and 1939.
The New Plan projected a change for most of the basic law
courses. It required year-long sequences with comprehensive examinations. It merged many previously isolated units to form the basic
curriculum, provided for seven areas of specialization, and required
tutorial work for students in the first year and individual research
in industry studies in the last. Increased importance was given to
procedure, criminal law and its administration, jurisprudence, legal
history, and law and economic organization-the last including
trade regulations, labor law, and bankruptcy and reorganization.
The program added to the law curriculum instruction in economic
theory, finance, accounting, and psychology. A course in Ethicswhich Katz described as one in moral and political philosophywas added, and provision was made for a closer fusion between
I

Katz, Memories of an Ex-Dean, 3 U. Cm. ALurm J. 21 (1977).
7Id.
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political theory and constitutional law. The program assumed
collaboration in teaching with colleagues and appointments to the
law faculty of scholars of other disciplines from other parts of the
University.8 The program had two models-a four-year and a threeyear curriculum. This made for future difficulties in the administration of the program, but initially the combination was helpful. The
New Plan was not intended to be final, nor was it presented as
earth-shaking. That would have been quite contrary to Wilber
Katz's realism, his sense of style and taste. He wrote simply: "There
is, of course, nothing new in the recognition of a close relation between law and the study of society."' And he added: "We propose
to consider a little more consciously whether anything worth while
can be said as to the ends which law should serve."
Wilber Katz was appointed dean of the Law School in 1939
upon the retirement of Dean Bigelow. It was a deanship, as Katz
wrote, that spanned "pre-war, war-time, and post-war years."" He
continued as dean until 1950. In 1939, he found that he had to be
concerned as dean with declining enrollment: "Students entering
''
both programs... [the four-year and the three-year] totalled 75. 12
He found that many liberal arts colleges were hostile to the University of Chicago because they resented Chicago's college plan which
began at the third year of high school. During the war years, of
course, enrollment fell drastically; the Law School lost most of its
building to the Air Force meteorology program. It also lost many of
its faculty members. Malcolm Sharp, if I recall correctly, went off
to train air pilots. Wilber Katz spent a considerable part of his time
in the Renegotiation Section of the Chicago Ordnance District.
Sheldon Tefft was acting dean for two years. Then in 1945 the students started coming back, bright and numerous, and understandably very anxious to get through the Law School in a hurry. The set
requirements of each program, and the interrelationships between
the two programs, flooded the dean's office each day with petitions
for variances. As 1950 approached, the dean found that the financial
problems of the School had become more pressing. The Law School
building was inadequate; there was inadequate space for books,
helped only by the fact that there were insufficient funds with which
to buy books. Aside from the G.I. benefits, there was very little

'This is what happened, as any intellectual history of the Law School will show.
Katz, A Four-YearProgram for Legal Education,4 U. Cm. L. REv. 527, 528 (1937).
' Id. at 531.
" Katz, Memories of an Ex-Dean, supra note 6, at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
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money for scholarships and fellowships. The financial situation was
a reflection of the problem of the University as a whole. Katz did
not enjoy such budget sessions as he had with Hutchins, even
though Hutchins fascinated and tantalized him. Katz enjoyed even
less the working budget sessions he was forced to have with other
officers of the administration who did not fascinate him.
Dean Katz was a central figure in maintaining the strength of
the faculty and the spirit of the institution. Ruth and Wilber Katz
as a team helped keep fresh the bonds of affection within the faculty
and with the students. To the faculty group that had worked together in fashioning the New Plan, splendid new appointments were
added after the war. For one of these new appointees-Roscoe Steffen-Wilber stripped himself of the honor of the John P. Wilson
Professorship and conferred it on the new appointee. It is true that
many of the requirements of the New Plan were abandoned. The
four-year program was given up. But the essential direction of the
plan continued. Wilber Katz in his quiet way provided unique intellectual leadership. A part of that leadership was the appreciation
he held for the work of others. Another part was his unquestioned
ability as a scholar and as a teacher. A third part was that as an
administrator he would never make a decision, one could be sure,
for a meretricious reason.
Nor had he neglected his duties as a member of the Bar. A few
examples out of many come to mind. In 1940, during the start of the
war-time period, he took it upon himself, in a courageous and carefully worked out address given before the Indiana State Bar Association, to warn against the symptoms of national hysteria already
appearing, with their impact on civil liberties. Characteristically,
after reminding the Bar of the safeguards in the Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, he took occasion to recall the
case of Meyer v. Nebraska,1 3 in which the Supreme Court had held
unconstitutional a law forbidding the teaching of foreign languages
in grammar schools. He compared it with the Gobitis" decision,
which had just come down that term, and in which the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, permitted a regulation
requiring daily flag salute by students in public schools to stand.
Carefully, he explained why he would have dissented in both cases.
It was a sober exploration of the issues-an exploration of the meaning of freedom and loyalty in the context of a discussion of the
purpose of government. His many-leveled talk included an appeal

13

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

" Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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to the Bar to support the work of the Committee on the Bill of
Rights of the American Bar Association.
Another example of Wilber Katz's service to the Bar was his
representation in 1945, by appointment of the United States
Supreme Court, of two prisoners. They sought a review by the
Court of the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court denying them
leave to file petitions for habeas corpus. The Court disn~issed the
writs of certiorari, 15 but went out of its way to state that in view of
the apparent condition of Illinois law, such a dismissal was not to
be taken as meaning that a federal district court might not entertain an original petition. The case-White v. Ragen-was part of
what Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy,
two years later called the Illinois "merry-go-round,"' 1 7 a "proce-

dural labyrinth. . made up entirely of blind alleys, each of which
is useful only as a means of convincing the federal courts that the
state road which the petitioner has taken [is] the wrong one."' 8
Wilber Katz made it his business to help straighten out the law in
Illinois (as he had in numerous other matters) to provide a viable
postconviction remedy. The University of Chicago Law Review in
the winter of 1948 carried his unusual letter of castigation of the
role of the Attorney General of Illinois in the perpetuation of this
merry-go-round." This necessary improvement of the law took
persistence and time.
It was clear sometime before 1950 that Wilber was anxious to
leave the deanship. He had given much of himself to these administrative duties and responsibilities, and he no longer had the enthusiasm for them that his best work reflected. Moreover, in a special
way, his intellectual life had been trained by and had responded to
the program that over the last twenty years he had fashioned for
himself and for others. He had grown in it. Central to that program,
as he saw it years before, was the effort to study standards for
individual and group conduct. This was what he came to see as the
essence of the law. And I believe it is also correct to say that he had
come to realize, as Justice Holmes had before him, that the nature
of this search for truth and understanding-for this is what it
was-had as its ultimate consummation and test the application of
"White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945) (per curiam).
" Id.
at 765.
" Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 570 (1947) (Rutledge, J., joined by Douglas, J. and
Murphy, J., concurring).
Is Id. at 567 (Rutledge, J., joined by Douglas, J. and Murphy, J., concurring).
It Katz, An Open Letter to the Attorney General of Illinois, 15 U. Cm. L. REv. 251 (1948).
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this knowledge and faith to himself." He very much wanted the
time to think, and write and teach.
He continued his teaching and his writing,2 ' lively and perceptive. In 1955, he was the Knapp Visiting Professor of Law at Wisconsin. In 1962, Ruth and Wilber left the University of Chicago, and
he became an active professor at the University of Wisconsin Law
School. In 1963, he gave the Julius Rosenthal Foundation Lectures
at Northwestern University on Religion and American Constitutions. Wilber retired from full-time services at the University
of
22
Wisconsin in 1970, but continued to teach beyond that date.
During his lifetime, Wilber was always the mentor and guide
of the University of Chicago Law School. We should continue to
think of him that way.
Edward H. Levit
The consummation ... comes when he applies this knowledge to himself. He may
put it in the theological form of justification by faith or in the philosophical one of the
continuity of the universe. I care not very much for the form if in some way he has
learned that he cannot set himself over against the universe as a rival god, to criticize
it, or to shake his fist at the skies, but that his meaning is its meaning, his only worth is
as a part of it, as a humble instrument of the universal power. It seems to me that this
is the key to intellectual salvation, as the key to happiness is to accept a like faith in
one's heart, and to be not merely a necessary but a willing instrument in working out
the inscrutable end.
O.W. HoLMES, Brown University-Commencement 1897, in COLLEC-ED LEGAL PAPERS 164,166
(1920).
21 See, e.g., Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 426
(1953); Katz, Law, Psychiatry,and Free Will, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 397 (1955); Katz, Natural
20

Law and Human Nature, 1 CATH. LAw. 70 (1955); Katz, The Philosophy of Midcentury

CorporationStatutes, 23 L. & CoNTEMP. PNoB. 177 (1958); Blum & Katz, Depreciationand
Enterprise Valuation, 32 U. Cm. L. Ray. 236 (1965); Katz, Radiationsfrom Church Tax
Exemption, 1970 Sup. CT.REv. 93.
2 For an extraordinarily sensitive portrayal of Wilber Katz, written by Harry Kalven,
Jr. upon Katz's retirement from teaching, see Kalven, Wilber G. Katz-The Gentle
Exemplar, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 954.
t Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago.

